Response to my commentator by Pinto, Robert C.
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM
Response to my commentator
Robert C. Pinto
University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Reply is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Robert C. Pinto, "Response to my commentator" (May 22, 2013). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 140.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/140
 Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-2. 
Response to my Commentator 
 
ROBERT C. PINTO 
 
Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argument and Rhetoric 
University of Windsor 
Windsor, Ontario 
Canada 
pinto@uwindsor.ca  
 
 
In his thoughtful comments Scott reads me as holding an “ecumenical epistemic 
theory of argument” on two fronts. 
First, from the fact that I formulate the issues that arise in epistemic 
approaches to argument in terms of the concept “reasonable” rather than in terms of 
“epistemic justification” he concludes I hold that  
 
the contentious issue of the nature of epistemic justification needn’t be inherited by 
[my] epistemic theory of argument.  
 
Such a reading of my view is, I think, misleading. Much of what I’ve written in the 
last 7 years has been devoted to spelling out in detail when and why it is reasonable 
to adopt one or another cognitive attitude toward a propositional content – a task 
that is quite analogous to that of addressing “the contentious issue of the nature of 
epistemic justification.” For example, Pinto (2006) attempts to develop a detailed 
account of argument evaluation and of the warrants to which such evaluation must 
revert: it defends a qualitative version of evidence proportionism that does not does 
not to my knowledge repeat anything else that has appeared in the epistemological 
literature to date. Again, Pinto (2009) is an extended account of what makes 
something a reason, and suggests (p. 291) that that, if we can deal with the threat of 
an infinite regress of reasons, we might equate its being reasonable to adopt an 
attitude A toward a propositional content with having a good reason all things 
considered to adopt that attitude. Moreover, the paper suggests (in notes 26 and 27 
on p. 290) how certain “internalist” moves suggested in Pollock (1995) and Pryor 
(2005) might enable us to deal with the threat of infinite regress.  
 Secondly, Aiken suggests my view is “is ecumenical with the other theories of 
argument”. He writes: 
 
Given that argument may have a variety of goals and our evaluation of it may take 
on the breadth of that variety, epistemic objectives with argument are the ones 
Pinto holds are “most interesting,” but are nevertheless [just one] among other 
objectives.  
 
Aikin is quite correct that my view is “ecumenical” in this respect. 
 
 
ROBERT C. PINTO 
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